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EDUCATION AS A NATURAL RIGHT
ALBERT GRANDE*
I. CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL LAw - SLAVERY AND
CRIES FOR PERSONAL AUTONOMY
Natural rights, that is, moral entitlements inherent in human
beings by virtue of being human, emerged during the great age of
the Enlightenment.1 Behind the emergence of these rights,
however, were millennia of historical development. The
eighteenth and nineteenth century formulation of individualistic
natural rights evolved out of the ancient concept of natural law.
Natural law is one of the dominant themes throughout the
history of thought. This concept, has been used to defend the
established order and to justify revolutions. Additionally, it has
been at the center of civic life, fundamental to such issues as
freedom, equality, order, and education:
Next to Christianity itself, probably nothing has had a more
profound and extensive effect on the history of Western
civilization than the Justinian compilations of Roman
law .... The chief Roman jurists who made the Justinian
code, Gaius, Ulpian, and Paulus, differed in their emphasis
of particular legal principles, but they agreed in regarding
Natural Law as a system of ideal laws founded in intuition
and right reason. 2
Professor, Educational Foundations Department, Buffalo State College, State University
of New York. Mr. Grande also practices law in West Seneca, New York. This paper was
originally delivered on July 13, 2005 in the Oxford Union, Oxford University as part of an
international conference devoted to education law sponsored by the Oxford Round Table,
St. Anne's College, and Oxford University.
I See R.H. Helmholz, Natural Human Rights: The Perspective of the Ius Commune, 52
CATH. U. L. REV. 301, 301 (2003) (noting widely held belief that natural law emerged
during Enlightenment, though it was foreshadowed in seventeenth century writings).
2 PETER J. STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 9 (Transaction
Publishers 2003) (1958).
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One of the earliest and most powerful expressions of natural
law is found in Sophocles' Antigone:
Yes, for it was not Zeus who gave them forth,
Nor Justice, dwelling with the Gods below,
Who traced these laws for all the sons of men;
Nor did I deem thy edicts strong enough,
Coming from mortal man, to set at naught
The unwritten laws of God that know not change.
They are not of to-day nor yesterday,
But live for ever, nor can man assign
When first they sprang to being. Not through fear
Of any man's resolve was I prepared
Before the Gods to bear the penalty
Of sinning against these.3
Antigone, with clear conscience, deliberately violates King
Creon's law that denies her brother a decent burial.4 Her brother
had been a rebel and was thereby denied the honor of a proper
burial. 5 Antigone appeals to the higher unwritten laws of God,
the eternal natural laws. 6 While it is unknown when those laws
originated, Antigone's act of defiance violates written laws in
favor of natural law, which respects a sister's right to bury her
brother, despite the king's prohibition. 7 Her assertion of the
higher natural law foreshadows the Enlightenment's
promulgation of individualistic natural rights.
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes the same
Sophoclean distinction between natural and positive law, law
created by legally valid procedures. Natural law "everywhere
has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or
that."8 Positive law is "originally indifferent, but when it has
been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom
shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be
3 SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, reprinted in NINE GREEK DRAMAs BY }ESCHYLUS,
SOPHOCLES, EURIPIDES AND ARISTOPHANES 269 (Charles W. Eliot ed., E. H. Plumptre
trans., P. F. Collier and Son 1909).
4 See id. (confessing to King Creon about her illicit deed).
5 See id. (professing weightiness of Antigone's acts of defiance).
6 See id. (following Zeus's laws rather than king's law).
7 See id. (pronouncing Antigone's high regard for natural law, which she considers far
more authoritative than law created by "mortal man").
8 THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 124 (Sir David Ross trans., Oxford
University Press 1925).
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sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular
cases .... "9
Natural law is "unchangeable and has everywhere the same
force."1O Similarly, Aristotle continues, "things which are just not
by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the
same."11 How are these natural laws known? According to
Aristotle, they are divined, perceived "through sympathy or
intuition."12 "No doubt Aristotle ... maintains that natural law is
known by inclination."13 Consequently, it follows that natural
law is inherently known through inclination, before it is
processed cognitively.14
Simon explains knowledge by inclination in the following
manner: "How do we know that it is wrong to cheat in the
execution of a contract?... We may be in disagreement on many
issues, but we would all agree that it is perfectly disgusting to
cheat in the execution of a contract ... ."15 Under normal
circumstances, cheating in the execution of a contract is so
disgusting that it leads us to feel a "real repugnance."16 "Here is
something unjust by nature, unright by nature."17 "It is
identified by way of inclination; or rather, the conflict of a certain
rule of action with an inclination warns us that this is not right,
that it is wrong."18
"Knowledge by inclination," Simon adds, "is not clear."19 "[It
may be certain" knowledge, but it is not a matter of "rational
communication."20 Inclination cannot be taught; there is a
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 YVES R. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW: A PHILOSOPHER'S REFLECTION
132 (Vukan Kuic ed., Fordham University Press 1992) (1965) (defining "divine" also as "to
detect; to foretell; presage; portend; to have or feel a presage or foreboding; to conjecture
or guess").
13 Id.
14 See id. (paraphrasing Simon's conclusion).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 133 (explaining universal innate understanding that cheating during
contract's execution is wrong).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. The author believes that while knowledge known by inclination may be certain,
it is definitely not clear. Id.
20 Id. While natural law may be known to an individual, it cannot be effectively
communicated as a way to influence another. Id. Anything can simply be explained to
another, in the form of an example of a situation, but an inclination is something that we
possess outside of our own understanding of a topic. Id. In other words, we know that it is
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"tendency toward as much understanding as possible," but,
ultimately, inclination is "incommunicable."21 This is true both in
Aristotle's natural-law idea and in Antigone's unwritten higher
law.2 2
Despite considerable variations in natural law's interpretation,
conceptually it is intended to provide a basis for norms in ethics,
law, politics, and education. 23 Natural law affirms a basis for
objective standards, looking for a predetermined order in human
affairs. 24 "This is the belief that there exists in nature and/or
human nature a rational order which can provide intelligible
value-statements independently of human will, that are
universal in application, unchangeable in their ultimate content,
and morally obligatory on mankind."25
According to Aristotle, natural law's principle purpose is to
create governmental organization, to wit, "the first and
fundamental aim of justice is not freedom for its own sake, but
order."26 Therefore, the belief that freedom's aim is to order
society, explains Aristotle's "preoccupation with the best forms of
government" in which the order of the state overrides the
freedom of the individual. 27  In Aristotle's ideal state,
philosophers possessing the natural intellect and education to
achieve the natural purpose of the state, which is the collective
pursuit of a virtuous life, would be the rulers. 28
wrong, yet we cannot know why it is wrong, nor effectively tell another why it is wrong.
Id.
21 Id.
22 See SOPHOCLES, supra note 3, at 269 (comparing "full clear and plain" kind-made
laws, to "unwritten laws of God"); see also SIMON, supra note 12, at 133 (characterizing
"knowledge by inclination" as "incommunicable" rather than "clear").
23 See PAUL E. SIGMUND, NATURAL LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT VIII (Winthrop
Publishers, Inc. 1971) (explaining natural law has contributed to ideological, political, and
scientific developments, and has been translated into moral or written law).
24 See id. (stating natural law helps define "rational order," so as to evaluate human
conduct).
25 Id.
26 HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW, A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY
AND PHILOSOPHY 13 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., B. Herder Book Co. 1947) (1946)
(describing ancient Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato as valuing "freedom ... so far
as it realizes order").
27 See id. (reiterating Aristotle's view that government should be "the sphere of
morality" and aid in "realization of all virtue").
28 ARISTOTLE, reprinted in THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 12 (B. Jowett trans.,
Clarendon Press 1885) (explaining those whose intelligence places them "above the toil"
should "occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics").
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Yet, Aristotle's concept of natural law, and his commitment to
order raise disturbing questions concerning social justice, as he
looks to nature to justify slavery.29 Some men, by nature, are
slaves: "[w]here there is such a difference as that between soul
and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those
whose business is to use their body; and who can do nothing
better), the lower sort are by nature slaves. .. .30 By contrast,
"those who are in a position which places them above toil, have
stewards who attend to their households while they occupy
themselves with philosophy or politics" are masters."31 Alf Ross'
admonition is apropos: "[1]ike a harlot, natural law is at the
disposal of everyone. The ideology does not exist that cannot be
defended by an appeal to the law of nature."32
For Aristotle, natural law is the source of order, unalterable
and just. 33 Positive law varies with every jurisdiction and is
subject to the "vicissitudes" of time and circumstance. 34
Nevertheless, natural and positive laws are not that remote from
one another, as "natural law has to be realized in the positive law
since the latter is the application of the universal idea of justice
to the motley manifold of life."35
While imperfections in positive law are inevitable, such flaws
are subject to correction by the principle of equity, namely, that
the individual case gets it right.36 The judge's function is to apply
29 Id. at 8 (observing nature, Aristotle finds that just as it is most efficient for both
humans and animals when humans tame animals, as humans are intellectually superior
and can use animals' physical strength to further human's various, it would be expedient
and mutually beneficial for intellectually superior men to use stronger, but intellectually
inferior men, as slaves).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 12.
32 H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 163 (Clarendon Press
1983) (quoting ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 261 (University of CA Press 1999) (1958)).
33 See ROMMEN, supra note 26, at 17 (analyzing the theories of Aristotle and stating
"[slome actions correspond to nature, and hence are naturally good; others are repugnant
to nature, and hence are naturally bad"); see also Louis Rene Beres, The Oslo Agreements
in International Law, Natural Law, and World Politics, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 715,
726 (1997) (explaining that Declaration of Independence, borrowing heavily from
philosophers like Aristotle).
34 See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 1036-37 (1995) (comparing how while common law transcends state lines,
positive law changes depending on jurisdiction).
35 ROMMEN, supra note 26, at 17.
36 See Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal
Christian Influences, and Medieval Authoritarian Impacts on the Evolution of Legal
Equitable Remedies, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 483, 485 (1997) (discussing that "[e]quity, then,
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natural law to the imperfections of positive law. 37 Unfortunately,
Aristotle has little to say about the content of natural law.
There is one salient distinction between Antigone's and
Aristotle's assertions of natural law. That is, Antigone's
affirmation of the individual, in defiance of the king's written
law, stands in marked contrast to Aristotle's emphasis upon the
political order. 38 Strictly speaking, in Aristotle, there is no
autonomous-individual natural law concept. 39 Rather, the state
is his overriding concern: the order of the state is grounded in
natural law.40
Aristotle's collective subordination of the individual to the
primacy of the state is widespread in the ancient world with one
remarkable exception-Stoicism.41 Stoics utilize the natural law
theory as the basis of individual autonomy.42 Thus, Stoics share
more beliefs with philosophers of the Enlightenment than
Aristotle.
Stoicism's contribution to natural law as a source of individual
sovereignty is considerable. Stoic ethical teachings emphasize
universalism in that all people are considered citizens of the
world, that is, citizens of the human republic.43 As Stoics created
moral universalism, 44 they are unlike Aristotle in that they are
individualists. Stoics extol the universal human republic where
all are equal by nature-a very un-Aristotelian notion.
provides judges an outlet of authority to resist applying uniform positive law to a
situation where the rules produce unfair results").
37 Id. (explaining judges apply natural law in ruling).
38 See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 26 (comparing Aristotle's and Sophocles'
respective views about natural law).
39 See supra text accompanying note 30 (justifying slavery).
40 See Roger A. Shiner, Aristotle's Theory of Equity, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1263
(1994) (noting that "Aristotle's conception of ethics, politics, and law is fundamentally
organic - the state and its citizens, their decisions and its laws, are part of the natural
world").
41 See James Muldoon, Symposium: Rethinking Rights: Historical, Political, and
Theological Perspectives: Article: Historical Perspective: Spiritual Freedom - Physical
Slavery: The Medieval Church and Slavery, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 69, 72 (2005) (asserting
slavery's pervasiveness in ancient world).
42 See Andrew Huxley, Book Review, Golden Yoke, Silken Text, 106 YALE L.J. 1885,
1940 (1997) (announcing Stoics' main goal was to preserve moral autonomy through
natural law).
43 See SIMON, supra note 12, at 30 (finding that "[o]ne of the most striking features of
the Stoics' teaching in ethics is their universalism, their sense of human unity, their belief
that human affairs are governed by rules that hold universally").
44 See id. (concluding that "[a]fter Plato and Aristotle, they are the main founders of
moral universalism").
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While the Stoic sage carries introspective happiness, he is not
just self-absorbed, but kind towards others. Happiness is the
exercise of right reason in accordance with nature. Nature and
reason are one.45 Human beings have an innate capacity for right
and wrong. The Stoic view seems to mirror Immanuel Kant's
categorical imperative, 46 which will be discussed later.
Innate understanding of right and wrong also provides a basis
for law. Natural law is universally valid, unchangeable and
eternally true. Common intelligence can distinguish good laws
from bad, justice from injustice: "[t]his, therefore, is a law, 0
judges, not written, but born with us, which we have not learnt,
or received by tradition .... "47 The test for whether or not a law
accords with nature is whether or not it agrees with reason. 48
Epictetus, an emancipated slave himself, declared that slavery
laws are "laws of the dead, an abysmal crime."49 Such [slavery]
laws are in violation of natural law, against human dignity.
Epictetus affirms natural law as a basis for freedom and
equality. Nature has produced all, making us prone to mutual
affection and friendship. 50
Epictetus transcends Aristotelian primacy of order; he
possesses a moral indignation that argues powerfully against
slavery. 51 It can be argued that Stoicism, as exemplified by
Epictetus and other Stoics, used natural law to promulgate
human dignity more decisively than early Christianity.
St. Paul, for example in Ephesians tells slaves to "be obedient
unto them that according to the flesh are your masters, with fear
45 See generally ROMMEN, supra note 26, at 21 (acknowledging repudiation of "base
sensuality, pursuit of wealth, and pride of life," in favor of "happiness of mind through the
truth, the good, and the beautiful").
46 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV.
961, 1360 n.971 (2001) (noting Peter Singer's observation that "impartial standard for
ethics" was expressed by Stoics); see also Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1867 (2000) (noting equality among people as fundamental to
Kant's categorical imperative, and other natural law theories).
47 ROMMEN, supra note 26, at 23 n.10 (quoting Cicero in his speech for T.A. Milo).
48 See Cristobal Orrego, H.L.A.Hart's Arguments Against Classical Natural Law
Theory, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 297, 310 (2003) (noting natural law's traditional requirement is
"practicable reasonableness"); see also Jack B. Sarno, A Natural Law Defense of Buckley v.
Valeo, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2693, 2728 n.261 (1998) (quoting Thomas Aquinas as writing
"[w]hatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature
of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason is in accord with the nature of
man, as man.").
49 ROMMEN, supra note 26, at 24.
50 Id. at 25 (emphasizing humans all are "parts of one great body" created by nature).
51 Id. at 24 (denouncing slavery).
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and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ."52
Since early Christians believed the new kingdom imminent, they
tended to resign themselves to the political and social order. 53
Moreover, Christians believed if a man was called to be a slave,
he should not be free: "[flor he that was called in the Lord being a
bondservant, is the Lord's freedman: likewise he that was called
being free, is Christ's bondservant."54
Early Christians were allowed to hold fellow Christians as
slaves. 55 In the fourth century, St. Basil could not even fathom a
single reason for which Christian slaves ought to be freed. 56
According to St. Augustine, slavery is a remedy as well as a
penalty for sin, and it was God who bore the direct responsibility
for appointing both masters and slaves. 57 All slaves, then,
deserve to be slaves.
Even though the new kingdom appeared increasingly less
imminent to Christians, they tended to accept the institution of
slavery as necessary.58 No man is innocent of sin. Slavery,
therefore, is necessary for controlling sin in society. 59 "[T]he
canons of the church reinforced civil law in protecting owners
against the loss of slaves . ."60 "[N]o slave could be ordained
unless he had first been emancipated." 61 "The fact that
Christians accepted the institution [of slavery] until the
eighteenth century without marked protest suggests a high
degree of tolerance."62
52 Ephesians 6:5-6 (American Standard Version).
53 See George P. Smith, II, Article: Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical
Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 676
(1995) (noting that early Christians viewed human political and social institutions as
"unchangeable").
54 1 Corinthians 7:21-22 (American Standard Version).
55 See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 86
(Cornell University Press 1966) (noting Christians were permitted to hold other
Christians as slaves, provided they treated them as "spiritual brethren").
56 See id. (commenting on Saint Basil's failure to interpret an opposition to slavery,
being that in his Epistle, Saint Paul had "set a precedent for admonishing and returning
fugitives to their masters").
57 See Muldoon, supra note 41, at 76 (stating, "St. Augustine argued, slavery, like
other forms of physical coercion, was necessary for the good order of society in man's
fallen state").
58 See DAVIS, supra note 55, at 89 (asserting that Christian Church not only accepted
slavery, but exerted effort to secure masters' property right over their slaves).
59 See id. (noting Church's functional conception of slavery).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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As late as the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas
reconciled slavery with Christianity, finding it "consistent with
that part of the natural law which was still applicable to sinful
man."63 By contrast, slavery conflicts only with the first intention
of natural law (before the fall), but nct to the second intention,
which is adjusted to man's limited capacities, his sinful nature.64
Slavery is useful and necessary; it is agreeable to man's natural
reason in a sinful world.65
Aquinas comes close to believing in the natural inferiority of
slaves, asserting slavery is a condition of the body; and the
mother, since she provides the substance of the body, transmits
this condition to her offspring.66 This line of reasoning is very
much like Aristotle's argument regarding slaves' natural
inferiority, in that they are characterized by body rather than by
mind.67
Stoicism's use of natural law as a foundation for the moral
autonomy of the self is crucial to Western civilization's
commitment to the primacy of the individual. Noted historian
Norman F. Cantor summarizes the Stoic contribution to natural
law eloquently:
The concept of natural law (taken from Stoic philosophy)
assumes that the world operates according to rational
principles, that there are universal principles of reason.
The law of the state was regarded as the positive,
detailed implementation of natural law, and any law
that was repugnant to reason had to be bad law.68
Stoicism's doctrine of individual sovereignty, that is, absolute
right of control over oneself, profoundly inspired the modern
world's espousal of individual human rights-inalienable rights.
Philosopher Sidney Hook writes "[Ideologically, modern
democratic theory owes more to Stoic philosophy and Roman law
63 See id. at 95-96 (justifying slavery).
64 See id. at 96 (explaining slavery may be reconciled with natural law).
65 See id. at 89 (explaining "das Relive Naturrecht," first termed by Ernst Troeltsch,
which is the concept that "natural law adapted and modified for sinful man").
66 Id. at 96 (stating slavery is brought upon children through their mothers).
67 See supra text accompanying note 31 (explaining Aristotle's theory that those with
physical strength should carry out physical labor for those with intellectual strength, so
that intellectual superiors will have free time to devote to politics and philosophy).
68 NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 11 (HarperCollins
Publishers 1993) (1963).
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than to Christian Dogma."69 In light of Christian's theologians'
accommodation to slavery, Hook's claim is well-founded,
particularly in medieval and early modern times.
II. ENLIGHTENMENT NATURAL RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY
Natural law, though crucial to the development of natural
rights in the modern world, was not always on the side of higher
moral law. It provides Antigone with a noble appeal to an
unwritten higher law that demands a proper burial for her
brother, but it also provides justification for the institution of
slavery, e. g., Aristotle and his disciples, both non-Christian and
Christian. Aristotle lacks a concept of individual moral
autonomy. Rather, the state grants rights based upon the
individual's function.70 In addition, slaves perform a bodily
(manual labor) function that deprives them of the capacity for
citizenship and intellectual freedom. 71
Given Aristotle's intellectual preeminence in the Middle Ages
and in the early modern world, it is little wonder that he is not a
primary source of emancipation. Antecedents of Enlightenment
declarations of individual human (natural) rights are found in
Stoicism's commitment to individual human rights.72 Epictetus,
recall, proclaims the brotherhood of all men, and that slavery
laws are dead. His denunciation of slavery far exceeds anything
uttered by the early church fathers. 73
The most profound philosophical expression on behalf of
individual human autonomy is found in the works of Immanuel
69 SIDNEY HOOK, THE QUEST FOR BEING 92 (St. Martin's Press 1961) (1934).
70 See Rommen, supra note 26, at 13 (explaining the state's opinion on individuals);
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS § 5, 1254b6-7 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Clarendon Press 1885)
(explaining relationship between soul and body).
71 See Aristotle, supra note 70, at § 5, 1254b8 (positing that inferior beings by nature
are slaves).
72 See Helmholz, supra note 1, at 301 (commenting on origin of rights emerged during
Enlightenment era).
73 Compare Smith, supra note 53, at 676 (noting that early Christians resigned
themselves to social and political norms) with Martha C. Nussbaum, Symposium:
Classical Philosophy and the American Constitutional Order: Comments, 66 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 213, 217 (1990) (explaining that "Epictetus, himself once a slave, crusades tirelessly
against the relevance of these class distinctions, insisting that the only slavery and
freedom worth considering are in the individual soul").
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Kant (1724 - 1804). Kant lays the foundation for the modern
principle of individual freedom based upon a priori moral laws:
Freedom (independence from being constrained by
another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the
freedom of every other in accordance with universal
law, is the only original right belonging to every man
by virtue of his humanity. This principle of innate
freedom already involves the following authorizations,
which are not really distinct from it (as if they were
members of the division of some higher concept of a
right): innate equality, that is, independence from
being bound by others to more than one can in turn
bind them; hence a man's quality of being his own
master (sui iuris), as well as being a man beyond
reproach (iusti), since before he performs any act
affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone; and
finally, his being authorized to do to others anything
that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long
as they do not want to accept it - such things as
merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or
promising them something. . . .74
Kant's renowned categorical imperative derives from innate
moral laws. These moral laws tell us what we ought to do, apart
from any practical consequences. 75 Rational moral beings ought
to conform to universal standards of behavior. 76 These moral
laws are autonomous, the source of human freedom in ethical
life.77 They are not positive laws, that is, they are not empirically
based or theoretical descriptions; rather, they are laws unto
themselves, intrinsic moral laws reminiscent more of Antigone's
higher moral laws (unwritten) than to Aristotle's concept of
natural law. Moral laws are valid in themselves, and they are
never a means to an end.
74 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63 (Raymond Guess ed., Mary
Gregor trans., Cambridge University Press 1991).
75 See Timothy W. Floyd, Realism, Responsibility, and the Good Lawyer: Niebuhrian
Perspectives on Legal Ethics, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 596 (1992) (noting categorical
imperative is "binding on all ... regardless of the consequences").
76 See id. (citing Kant's example about how even lying to murderer about location of
his victim to save his life would be wrong, because all lying is immoral).
77 See Thomas D. Barton, Book Review: Fears and Conflicts: Liberalism Proper and
Proper Liberalism. by Gottfried Dietze., 37 STAN. L. REV. 1425, 1429 (1985) (stating
"perfect freedom" results from obeying categorical imperative).
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Moreover, Kant's categorical imperative declares that no
individual human being is ever to be treated as a means to an
end. Every person has an innate right to be respected as an
autonomous moral human being whose freedom should not be
infringed upon for utilitarian purposes. Consider the following
Kantian analysis:
[T]he right not be made a slave, the right not to be
punished if I am innocent, and the right not to be
experimented on without my consent. These are all
rights that would be defended by the utilitarian. Why?
Because societies that do not grant these rights are
likely to be more fearful, insecure, and thus unhappy
than societies that do grant these rights. Is this really
the correct reason? A persuasive case that is not the
correct reason has been made by the contemporary
Kantian John Rawls. Take slavery. According to
Rawls, there is something perverse from the moral
point of view in thinking that we must suspend
judgment on the morality of slavery until we find out
if the benefits to the slaveholders do or do not
outweigh the burdens placed on the slaves. This is
because there is a prior question of right here that the
utilitarian overlooks-namely, does the slaveholder
have a right to any of the benefits that he derives from
the unjust exploitation of his fellow human beings?
Rawls thinks that anyone who truly values the rights
and dignity of persons will answer no to this question
and will thus argue that the benefits to the
slaveholders should never be counted in the first place
and that the utilitarian calculations (do the benefits
outweigh the burdens?) will never be allowed to get off
the ground. Slavery is wrong because it allows some to
benefit through their unjust exploitation of others
(through violating a right against unjust exploitation)
and not because a system that allowed them such
exploitation would be unlikely to promote the general
welfare. On the Kant-Rawls view, slavery would be
wrong even if it did promote the general welfare.78
Slavery, then, or any other type of human exploitation, is
unconditionally wrong, as it violates human autonomy and
78 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 84 (Rowman &
Allanheld Publishers 1984).
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equality. Everyone has his own dignity, and is not to be used as
an object for someone else's end.79 There is, therefore, a
democratic basis to Kant's moral laws. Kant does not view
ordinary people as inferiors, but individuals to be treated with
respect, who should not to be taken advantage of. The less
fortunate are to be cared for; charity is a consequence of moral
law.
Kant's axiom that human beings should be treated as ends in
themselves and never as means, and that human beings have
dignity based upon their rational capacity to choose, provided a
foundation for Enlightenment's belief in natural rights.80 His
ethical system, a consequence of the categorical imperative, has
resonated through the generations. Among contemporary neo-
Kantian philosophers, none has been more influential than John
Rawls.
Rawls's A Theory of Justice,8 1 is a landmark in social justice
theory, and the most expansive application of Kant's ethical
system. Rawls's vision of a just society is premised upon what he
terms "the original position."8 2 This initial situation describes a
just society of rational, moral human beings who agree on certain
principles: "the first requires equality in the assignment of basic
rights, while the second holds that social and economic
inequalities .... of wealth and authority are just only if they
result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular
for the least advantaged members of society."8 3
Every person's well-being depends upon a scheme of
cooperation whereby everyone enjoys a satisfactory life,S4
including the benefit of education. There is no morally defensible
79 See David A.J. Richards, Public Reason and Abolitionist Dissent, 69 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 787, 791 (1994) (citing Kant's proposition that each man is "an end in himself').
80 See Roza Pati, Rights and Their Limits: The Constitution for Europe in
International and Comparative Legal Perspective, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 223, 230 (2005)
(explaining that "various interpretations of the concept of 'natural rights,' have been
essential parts of the French Enlightenment movement .... In particular, the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant contributed substantially to the conception and essence of
rights" when he explained that "we, as human beings, should always treat humanity with
liberty and equality, without one trying to overpower the other purely for personal gains
in the most selfish manner").
81 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF A JUST ICE (Harvard University Press 1999) (1971).
82 Id. at 11.
83 Id. at 13.
84 See James W. Nickel, Rethinking Rawls's Theory of Liberty and Rights, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 763, 764 (1994) (explaining veil of ignorance and original position allows
individuals to choose principles to live by regardless of specific personal characteristics).
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explanation for inequality in wealth and status that benefits
some at the expense of others. Moreover, no individual deserves
his wealth or status. These privileged conditions are not earned,
rather, they derive from undeserved advantages of genetic
endowment and social-class origin. This Rawlsian notion of
undeserved rewards stemming from native endowment and
social-class privilege has drawn spirited rebuke from critics,
especially conservatives.8 5
Nonetheless, Rawls maintains that the accidents of original
endowment and social circumstances cannot justify inequalities
of wealth and status. A just society must nullify these
"undeserved advantages" in order to serve those less
advantaged.8 6 Unless the welfare of all is provided for in society,
these advantages are unjust and unacceptable.8 7
According to Rawls, then, in the original position, it follows
that rational, moral human beings will choose the principles of
justice as fairness to all, and will eliminate the arbitrary
inequalities based upon native endowment and social
circumstance.8 8 Rawls considers this vision of a just society the
most reasonable with respect to fairness and equality.8 9 Notably,
the original position is hypothetical in nature; it is an intuitive
notion much like Kant's faith in the categorical imperative.
Rawls adopts Kant's priority of right as crucial to a just
society: "This priority of the right over the good in justice as
fairness turns out to be a central feature of the conception." 90
Good for the Utilitarian, for example, might be maximum net
85 See, e.g., Rex Martin, Rawls's New Theory of Justice, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 737, 737
(1994) ("Rawls's theory ... is not, on its own terms, an acceptable or accredited theory of
critical moral justification. For that procedure does not satisfy its own goal: of wielding a
set of objectively based considerations for fairly assessing rival principles of justice.").
86 See Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Law of Above Averages: Leveling the New Genetic
Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L. REV. 517, 540 n.82 (2000) (noting causes Rawls
identifies for "undeserved advantages").
87 See C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive
Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 963 (1983) (explaining individuals
original position would seek to avoid these "unacceptable" outcomes).
88 See Nickel, supra note 84, at 764 (discussing original position).
89 See Gary Chartier, Peoples or Persons? Revising Rawls on Global Justice, 27 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 33 (2004) (asserting "U]ustice as fairness, defended in politically
liberal terms, might be-indeed, Rawls clearly thinks it is-more reasonable than any
alternative").
90 RAWLS, supra note 81, at 28.
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pleasure, 91 which in a Rawlsian society is unacceptable. Rawls
views natural rights as embedded deep into ethical theory, even
deeper than any utilitarian cost/benefit analysis:
Each member of society is thought to have an
inviolability founded on justice or, as some say, on
natural right, which even the welfare of every one else
cannot override. Justice denies that the loss of
freedom for some is made right by a greater good
shared by others. 92
Rawlsian expansion of Kant's categorical imperative, however,
presents some troubling aspects. If rewards are the function of
genetics and circumstances and therefore undeserved, it
undermines Kant's imperatives of morality, to wit, individual
free will in choosing a life. Individual free will for Kant is an
exercise of rationality.93 Individual reward, then, might well be
the result of moral, rational choices. And the reward thereby
would be deserved.
Kantian ethics respects individual self-development as a
consequence of rational decision-making. 94 Individuals are
responsible for their own actions because they possess an inner
will that freely makes choices about which way they will conduct
their lives. By contrast, Rawls, by making reward a function of
native endowment and circumstance, robs individuals of Kantian
moral autonomy and personal responsibility.
III. EDUCATION AS A NATURAL RIGHT: MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT
AND HORACE MANN
Among voices implementing Enlightenment to promote
women's natural rights, none is more boldly eloquent than that of
91 See Loretta M. Kopelman & Michael G. Palumbo, The U.S. Health Delivery System:
Inefficient and Unfair to Children, 23 AM. J. L. & MED. 319, 324 (1997) (citing John Stuart
Mill's theory).
92 Id. at 28.
93 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Symposium on Kantian Legal Theory: Law As a Kantian
Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472, 483-84 (1987) (detailing relationship between free
will and practical reason).
94 J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional
Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 571 (2004) (explaining Kant espoused "non-interference in
the life of an individual" as most preferable path to self-development).
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Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797).95 As the daughter of an
abusive, alcoholic father, she tried to shield her mother and
sister from mistreatment.96 Consequently, she was personally
exposed to the injustice inflicted upon women.
In her landmark feminist manifesto, Vindication of the Rights
of Woman (1792),97 Wollstonecraft demands equality for women
in a male dominated world. She rejects the prevailing notion
that women live merely to please men and that they lack the
capacity of reason necessary for learning.98 Yet, Wollstonecraft
argued women, when afforded the same opportunity of education
as men, have the same capacity to reason as men. Moreover, she
affirmed education is a birthright for women just as it is for
men.99 According to Wollstonecraft, both boys and girls should
attend national day schools, as girl's neglectful education is a
"grand source of misery."100
Wollstonecraft attributed the grim condition of women stems
from a "false system of education ... gathered from the books
written on this subject by men who, considering females rather
as women than human creatures, have been more anxious to
make them alluring mistresses ... ."101
According to Wollstonecraft, apart from greater physical
strength, men are in no way superior to women. Male
domination of governmental institutions, along with a false
system of education, has rendered women weak and
submissive. 102 False refinement has made them artificial and
pitiful, in a state of "perpetual childhood."103 Rather, women
95 Wikipedia, Mary Wollstonecraft, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiMary_.Wollstonecraft
(last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
96 See id. (noting Mary's parental role over her siblings).
97 MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN, reprinted in
THE WORKS OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT (Janet Todd & Marilyn Butler eds., New York
University Press 1989).
98 Id. at 73 (declaring men consider "females rather as women than human
creatures").
99 Id. at 76 (claiming image of female delicacy, created by pretty words, has deprived
women of education necessary to spur them onto greater action).
100 Id. at 73 (denouncing lack of educational opportunities for women).
101 Id. at 73.
102 Id. at 76 (stating "education of women has, of late, been more attended to than
formerly; yet they are still reckoned a frivolous sex, and ridiculed or pitied by the writers
who endeavor by satire or instruction to improve them").
103 Id. at 75 (expressing wish to treat women as "rational creatures" rather than
children).
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should "endeavour to acquire strength, both of mind and
body."104 Further:
[T]o convince them that the soft phrases, susceptibility
of heart, delicacy of sentiment, and refinement of
taste, are almost synonymous with epithets of
weakness, and that those beings who are only the
objects of pity and that kind of love, which has been
termed its sister, will soon become objects of
contempt. 105
Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Woman
represents a milestone in feminist assertion of intellectual
equality with man. It is a woman's birthright to be educated, not
for submission to male domination, but for equal opportunity of
rational development.106 As an enlightened advocate for equal
rights for men and women, and as an opponent of political
constraints on women, Wollstonecraft stands head and shoulders
above such luminaries as Rousseau and Jefferson. Her only male
counterpart is the architect of the common school movement,
Horace Mann (1796-1859).107
Mann's vision of free public schools, became the foundation of
the modern American system of universal education, and is
considered his greatest achievement.OS His passionate belief in
the common school movement rested upon natural law, which
compels the state to provide schools that prepare individuals to
perform all the duties essential to citizenship.1 09
104 Id. (urging women to reject their societal placement as inferior to men, and
instead, to use education to advance their placement in society).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 76 (explaining need to "educate a rational and immortal being for a nobler
field of action," and declaring women's' education should prepare them for life, and not
simply for marriage).
107 See Wikipedia, Horace Mann, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HoraceMann (last
visited Oct. 6, 2006) (summarizing Horace Mann's life and works).
108 See Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism, and its
Effects on Liberty Equality and Choice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1178 (2003) (noting Mann,
along with Thomas Jefferson, believed public education to be a "prerequisite for
democratic governance").
109 See id. (maintaining public education or "a public commitment to provide each
child with a free education at public expense," was adopted to promote public purpose of
civic involvement).
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Mann views education as an absolute or a natural right, as it
rescues individuals from ignorance, poverty, and vice. 110 Natural
right demands the creation of free, public schools, which pass on
knowledge of earlier generations. The fundamental law of the
state establishes public schools to serve as instruments of civic
enlightenment. i"'
Mann's twelve annual reports to the Massachusetts Board of
Education are classics in the history of education. His Tenth
Annual Reportl1 2 is possibly the clearest most forceful expression
of education as a natural right ever written:
I believe in the existence of a great, immutable
principle of natural law, or natural ethics,-a principle
antecedent to all human institutions and incapable of
being abrogated by any ordinances of man,-a
principle of divine origin, clearly legible in the ways of
Providence as those ways are manifested in the order
of nature and in the history of the race,-which proves
the absolute right of every human being that comes
into the world to an education; and which, of course,
proves the correlative duty of every government to see
that the means of that education are provided for
all.113
Every child has a natural right to education that will enable
him to perform all domestic, social, civil, and moral duties.
Education is as natural to the child as breathing and seeing: "a
child without education is poorer and more wretched than a man
without bread."114
Mann's vehemence on behalf of education as a natural right is
again expressed in his opposition to slavery, as he states slavery
is "against natural right."115 "There is no justification 'for it in
the eternal principles of justice and equity .... All the noblest
110 See THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE
MEN 62 (Lawrence A. Cremin ed., Teachers College Press 1957) (arguing knowledge and
abundance are inextricable, and that knowledge teaches wealth and virtue).
111 Id. at 62-63 (expounding education as absolute right, thus demanding
government's funding such education).
112 Id. at 59-78 (quoting Mann's Tenth Annual Report).
113 Id. at 63.
114 Id. at 103 (justifying taxation to support schools).
115 ROBERT B. DOWNS, HORACE MANN: CHAMPION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS 130 (Twayne
Publishers 1974) (examining the morality of slavery).
[Vol. 21:1
EDUCATIONASA NATURAL RIGHT
instincts of human nature rebel against it."116 Further, slavery is
the "most compact, and concentrated, and condensed system of
wrong which the depravity of man ever invented."11 7
Though Mann lacks the philosophical stature of Kant, he
possesses comparable devotion to moral law, in that they both
believe such moral law is innate. Every individual acts freely
from conscience, and by so doing, he respects his own and others'
moral freedom and personal dignity. Kant's categorical moral
imperative cannot be proven. It belongs to the realm of moral
freedom, outside the world of phenomena, in time and space: "In
contrast to laws of nature, these laws of freedom are called moral
laws .... But it is different with moral laws. They hold as laws
only insofar as they can be seen to have an a priori basis and to
be necessary."llS
Kant believes that human beings possess an innate sense of
conscience, a categorical moral imperative to act freely and to
treat others with respect. 119 Human beings are autonomous and
should never be used as means to another's ends. Individuals
must act as if to comply with a universal moral standard.120
Kantian ethics are based upon an unassailable principle: the
absolute worth of every human being.
CONCLUSION
The theory of education as a natural right has a storied
history, and can be traced from the rejection of slavery in the
Enlightenment to a greater understanding and promotion of
individual autonomy. The idea of education as a form of a
natural right developed more recently from those principles,
taking the form of physical systems of education as in the
writings of Horace Mann. However, it also takes on theoretical
manifestations, as in the writings of John Rawls. Society as it
exists today is, of course, a far cry from Rawls's original position.
However, being what it is, education is a right and a goal founded
116 Id.
117 Id. (expressing Mann's contempt for slavery).
118 KANT, supra note 74, at 42-43 (differentiating moral law from laws of nature).
119 See supra text accompanying notes 74-76 (discussing why all forms of human
exploitation are unconditionally wrong).
120 See id. (explaining foundations for modern theory of individual freedom).
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on refuting servitude, and evidences itself as an institution
available to all persons as an immutable, freely given choice.
